Connor Haley began managing his own portfolio on Jan 1, 2007 and has beaten the market by over 9%/ year since inception. He took a gap year between high school and his freshman year at Harvard, which allowed him to devote himself to investing full-time. During the gap-year, he worked at... More
In this write-up, I will first give all the reasons why I like MSG and think that it is conservatively worth $32/share with upside over $50. Then, I will thoroughly address the variant view.
There are many reasons to like MSG:
Reasons to like MSG
Recently spun-off of Cablevision (spinoffs tend to beat the market)
Every recent U.S. publicly traded sports team has been bought out at a substantial premium (Boston Celtics, Cleveland Indians, and Florida Panthers).
MSG has a collection of irreplaceable trophy assets (The Garden, Knicks, Rangers) that are trading at a serious discount to private market value
The NBA summer free agency period is a near-term potential catalyst
Thesis
Shares of Madison Square Garden (MSG), which were recently spun off of Cablevision, offer investors the opportunity to buy a collection assets (Knicks, Rangers, the Garden, MSG/MSG+) at a serious discount to their private market value.
My sum of the parts analysis suggests that at the current price, there is little downside, but significant upside. Specifically, I believe that MSG’s assets are worth at least $32 with upside over $50. Below is a brief description of each of the segments followed by my conservative sum of the parts valuation. Even using the most conservative estimates, I reach a value of $32 a share.
Media
MSG owns and operates three cable networks, MSG, MSG+, and the Fuse network. These networks generate revenue through subscriber fees from pay-tv operators (approx. 80% of segment revenue) as well as through advertising (approx. 20% of segment revenue).
MSG/MSG+: The most valuable of the Company’s networks, MSG and MSG+ are regional sports networks that broadcast the New York Knicks, New York Rangers, New York Liberty, New York Islanders, New Jersey Devils, Buffalo Sabres and New York Red Bulls games. Additionally, they carry several other sports programming, including major college basketball and football games. The first major non-Knicks/Rangers contract, with the Buffalo Sabres, ends in 2017. Each network has over 8 million subscribers, primarily in the NY, NJ, and CT areas.
FUSE: Fuse focuses on music related programming including coverage of premier artists, events and festivals, original content and high profile concerts and has over 50mm subs.
*The media segment is the easiest to predict as much of it is based on contracts with the cable operators that are somewhat predictable. I expect 2010 EBITDA of $153-159 million. I take the midpoint of that range for my valuation.
Sources of Revenue: tickets, concessions, television (both national TV contracts and local cable rights), sponsorship, and merchandise.
Both major teams, the Knicks and the Rangers, have been pretty terrible lately, which has led to poor economic performance.
*The sports segment assumes the teams perform slightly better and the Knicks pay lower luxury tax, but still produces negative EBITDA. It should be noted that the Knicks paid out $24.9 million in 2008 and $23.5 million for the nine months ended September 30, 2009 for costs associated with transactions relating to players on our sports teams for season-ending and career-ending injuries, but mainly for waivers and terminations of players and other team personnel, including team executives. However, these costs should come down as the team basically has a clean slate heading into this summer’s free agent frenzy. It should be noted that under my conservative assumptions, I am not valuing any sort of catalyst for the Knicks/ media segment that one or two big-time free agents could provide. I take the midpoint of my 2010 Consolidated Sports EBITDA estimated range to get to a small loss (approx. 10 million) for my valuation.
Entertainment
MSG creates, produces, and presents a variety of live productions. It earns revenue based on ticket sales on shows that it promotes, as well as license fees on non-promoted shows.
The Company has 100% ownership of Madison Square Garden Arena, the Theater at Madison Square Garden, and the Chicago Theater (purchased in 2008 for $16 million). It also owns 50% of the 4.5 million square feet of air rights above MSG. It has long term leases on the Radio City Music Hall and Beacon Theater, and a long-term booking agreement with the Wang Theater. In total, the Company’s venues host over 800 events per year.
*The entertainment segment is the most economically sensitive, and therefore the most difficult to predict, but these assumptions are fairly conservative with 2010 expectations still far below 2007 profitability. I have decided to assign ZERO value for this segment in my sum of the parts valuation. The reason for this is that it is difficult to predict, and I feel that assigning it zero value is an extremely conservative assumption that potentially provides my valuation considerable upside with an improving economy. This makes me feel more comfortable with the valuation since I am not really betting on an economic recovery (although that would also obviously provide considerable upside).
Valuation:
One of the primary reasons investors are dismissing MSG is that the approximately $800 million of cap ex remaining related to a major renovation at Madison Square Garden will not be a good investment for shareholders. I generally agree with that statement because it is difficult to know exactly how the capex will be spent, although there are several ways it could increase sales and attract more marquee events. Regardless, I have treated this expense in my conservative valuation as if the company just burns all $800 million in cash and receives zero economic benefit.
*The Sports Forbes values only account for The New York Knicks and New York Rangers. Therefore, my valuations disregard any value from the New Yor,k Liberty or Hartford Wolf Pack
Conservative Case
Value ($mm)
Methodology
Sports
1002
Forbes Value
Media
2013
11X midpoint of 2010E segment EBITDA
Entertainment
0
Assigning zero value for this segment
Net Cash
260
$190 CVC receivable and 70 million net cash
Renovation
-800
0 NPV for Garden Renovation
Other
0
Assumes zero value for MSG air rights or other assets
Equity Value
2475
Equity Value/Share
32.74
Why My Assumptions Are Conservative
All recent sports transactions have been at significant premiums to the Forbes Values and none of them have had the allure of
MSG and MSG+ are largely “Tivo-proof” since most viewers prefer to watch sports live, and operate under long-term contracts. Because of this, they command premium pricing and deserve a higher multiple. Several research reports agree with this thinking and point to a variety of recent transactions as evidence.
For example, in November of 2009, Liberty Media merged its stake in DirecTV along with its RSNs, and as part of a fairness opinion associated with the transaction, the middle end of the valuation for the RSNs valued them at approximately 11x EBITDA (the multiple I used for 2010E). There is no reason why MSG and MSG+ aren’t worth similar multiples. “RSN’s” typically traded around 15-20 EBTIDA multiples before the financial crisis, and recent transactions have been in the 10-15 multiple range. Because of this, I feel like the 11 EBITDA multiple is very reasonable for such a high end RSN that consistently produces over 100M in EBITDA and could potentially benefit from this summer’s big NBA free agency splash.
The entertainment business is perhaps the trickiest to value because it has been pretty volatile, and is more sensitive to the health of the economy. In 2006 and 2007, this segment produced over $40 million of EBITDA and EBITDA margins of 16.6% and 14.9%, respectively. In 2008, MSG expanded at the worst possible time, and the other businesses in this segment also came under pressure. As a result, EBITDA declined to marginally positive levels, but MSG has made significant adjustments across this segment after the financial crisis. Despite the potential value here, I have decided to assign zero value to this segment since it is very sensitive to the economy and basically broke even last year. I feel that this is yet another VERY conservative assumption.
The sale and recent valuation of Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment, the Company which owns the Air Canada Centre, the Raptors (NBA), Maple Leafs (NHL), and the regional sports networks which broadcast the team’s games is a good comp because it included an arena, an NBA team, an NHL team, and the regional sports networks, but this still represented a minority interest in far less valuable assets near the height of the economic crisis, all of which point to significantly more value for MSG’s similar assets, with potential additional value from MSG’s entertainment assets, Fuse network, MSG air rights, etc. In December of 2008, a 7.5% minority interest was sold in Maple Leaf Sports for $90 million, valuing the whole Company at $1.2 billion. This suggests much greater value for MSG’s assets. Remember that MSG’s market cap is currently only 1.6B.
The Variant View:
1) Questionable Management
Although an insider control discount of is appropriate, I do not see why there should be any further cut. There has been plenty of speculation that this spin off was part of their estate planning, and that in the end, James Dolan would like to take MSG private.
In terms of their sports management decisions, they really can’t do any worse, but I think we could really be buying at a low. They recently signed Amare, and have a chance for Carmelo next year
2) MSG is spending too much (approx. 800 million) to renovate The Garden, which is unlikely to be a good investment for shareholders
I think it is too early to make such a conclusion, but I have decided to treat this cash as if they immediately burned it (even though it will be over three years)… and provided zero economic benefit. I still reach an attractive valuation with several other conservative estimates. In addition, renovations could potentially lead to more marquee events for their entertainment segment, as well as additional revenue streams for their sports teams (new premium seating).
3) Potential NBA lockout (this actually applies to the NHL as well)
I believe an NHL work stoppage is very unlikely since the players have a powerful recent memory of the lost 2003-2004 season, and both the players and owners realize the league can’t survive another hit like in 2003-2004.
The NBA lockout is much more likely than an NHL one because the players association has taken a tough stance to the NBA’s initial proposal to lower player compensation significantly. While this is certainly a risk, I think it is unlikely that there will be a work stoppage, and a resolution is more likely to positively impact team economics relative to the current collective bargaining agreements. In addition, it would not be the end of the world for the sports segment. MSG would still have the Rangers games, and could then use the arena to host a variety of other sporting events as well as compliment their entertainment business. The values of sports franchises do not decline because of the short-term lockout, and they have historically been cash flow negative, so this is not a nightmare scenario.
Concluding points: The three points addressed in the variant view are legitimate, but I don’t think it justifies the dirt cheap valuation. If you’re uncomfortable with the management situation, or looking for a company selling at a huge discount to present free cash flow, this is probably not for you. However, Madison Square Garden is a classic deep value special situation, with informational inefficiencies surrounding a spin off, sports franchises that are poised for a rebound (summer free agency), and a collection of irreplaceable trophy assets selling at a serious discount to private market value. As the company gets more institutional coverage, I expect this spinoff to outperform the market as it trades back up to realistic multiples. In addition, I would not be surprised if the company was taken private at a substantial premium, which is exactly what has happened to every other recent U.S. based public sports team.
Regards,
Connor Haley
Disclosure: At the time of writing, Connor Haley owned shares of Madison Square Garden (MSG).
In an industry that has come under fire lately, one company has continued to shine.
Activision Blizzard (ATVI), now the world’s largest maker of video game, remains as committed to innovation and excellence as ever, and continues to stay strong in these tough times.
1) THE BUSINESS
Activision Blizzard is an undisputed leader of the video game industry. As their industry undergoes a significant transformation, they have managed to avoid the pitfalls that some of its major rivals have fallen into. For instance, Electronic Arts, hasn’t posted positive earnings in years and has lost 75% of its value since its 2008 highs. Activision Blizzard, has not only stood pat during this time, but has also managed to position itself as its industry’s leader for years to come. The “Activision” segment is the more traditional (yet still excellent) developer and publisher of console and computer games such as the enormously popular Tony Hawk, Call of Duty, and Guitar Hero franchises. This segment of the businessis known for its volatility, which should be expected from the traditional video game industry: when a popular, well marketed new video game is released, money can come flooding into the company, but it can then experience periods of relatively little cash coming in. However, in what I see as an ingenious merger, Activision joined forces with Blizzard Entertainment.
Unlike it’s console-based peers, Blizzard specializes in the new online gamingspace that is revolutionizing the industry. These are games like the massively successful World of Warcraft franchise. Developers are able to continually improve and expand the product even after the game is released through online updates and expansion packs. But that’s not even the best part (at least not for investors). With these kinds of games, the developer can collect regular subscription fees along with the one-time price of the video game, giving Activision Blizzard to have the best of both worlds: the big hits such as Modern Warfare 2 that rake in millions in just a few weeks, along with the ultra-consistent cash flows from its online subscriber base. In fact, just from WOW alone, Activision Blizzard brings in a cool $75 million every month! No accounting tricks. Just cold, hard cash. And with the long awaited releases of Cataclysm, am expansion pack to World of Warcraft, and Starcraft II, you can be confident that the money will continue flowing in. Throw in a nice 2.5% dividend (unheard of in the gaming industry), and you’ve got one heck of a business.
2) THE MANAGEMENT
The president and CEO of Activision Blizzard, Robert Kotick (“Bobby”) has been in his position for almost twenty years now, and shows no signs of leaving anytime soon. His strategic acquisition of Blizzard Entertainment demonstrates his vision of the gaming industry and his drive to occupy its peak. His CFO/COO, Thomas Tippl, recently described his boss in an interview: “Bobby has incredibly vision, unbelievable energy. Activision Blizzard is his job, his hobby, and his sport.” Now THAT is what I like to hear about a Chief Executive.
3) THE PRICE
Don’t be fooled by the high P/E multiple of 48. Instead, you should looking at the company’s Price/ Free Cash Flow, a more accurate measurement of a company’s value. The cash machine that is Activision Blizzard is currently only trading at about 11x free cash flow, a very good value for a company expected to grow at a rate of 14% over the next five years. Plus, an industry leader and cash flow machine like Activision Blizzard deserves to be trading at a PEG higher than 1.08!
4) THE SAFETY NET
Using very reasonable growth assumptions, I peg the fair value of Activision Blizzard somewhere around near $17 range (and that’s not even including the $2.63 cash per share they’ve got in the bank), but the stock is still hovering around $11, giving you a 35% margin of safety on your investment. Also don’t forget they pay a nice dividend as well so you get paid to wait for the market to wake up to the true value of this great business.
5) THE EXECUTION
We’re in Activision Blizzard for the long haul, so we don’t need to sweat too much about a few pennies on our entrance. Given the value of this company and the discount at which the market is offering it, I am a buyer of this stock right now.
By Connor Haley with Sam Souryal
Disclosure: At the time of writing, Connor Haley owned shares of Activision Blizzard (ATVI). Sam does not own any shares in the companies mentioned.
With downside protection from a recent buyout offer, an inflection point in number of subscribers, a strong likelihood for a higher buyout bid, and a ridiculously cheap valuation, Spark Networks (LOV) is my favorite current holding and is an active recommendation in The College Edge on www.CollegeStockPicks.com
Shares currently trade at $3.47, but I value them closer to $6. Even my most conservative estimate (which I share below) values them $4.21, or 20% undervalued.
For those unfamiliar with this small-cap (70 MM), they operate several different niche online dating sites, most notably JDate.com.
Online dating (especially niche dating sites) is a great business:
•Customers supply the inventory (pictures of themselves) •The company has negative working capital benefit (subscribers pay monthly subscription upfront) •Online subscription dating industry averages 20% operating margins (Match(part of IACI), Meetic, eHarmony) •Subscription based dating is an attractive oligopoly: Top 5 control 80% of the market, generate $1.2bn in revenue with industry profits of $240mn+ annually. •Attractive value proposition--- avg sub pays $27.50 for JDate and $15 for other affinity •100mm singles in US (short cycle, high churn, very profitable business)
What makes JDate particularly attractive (taken from investor presentation)
•80% come to the site organically (word of mouth referrals and high winback rates) •Spends only 33% of the industry avg in marketing (6-7% vs. 20%+) •13 years in business.... it dominates the Jewish dating market in major metropolitan cities in US. •1/3 of members make over $100K, 2/3 make over $55K •45% of graduate degrees •94% of subscribers have college degrees •55% women 45% men •90-93% contribution margins = revenue less marketing
Two recent events highlight JDate’s value. First, Great Hill Partners (GHP), a private equity firm which owns 44% of the shares outstanding, recently offered to take the company private at $3.10/share, which represented a small premium to the existing price. Several big stakeholders, notably Osmium Partners, came out and urged the special committee to vote against the takeover, as they valued the company at $6-7 per share. The bid was rejected unanimously from the special committee, and they hired Piper Jaffray to “pursue other strategic alternatives.” In essence, I think that there is a good chance that we will see a higher offer--- either from Great Hill Partners or even one of the bigger online dating services such as Match.com, which would then dominate the niche dating area. Online dating is highly scalable, and at its current valuation, Spark Networks would be a steal for one of the bigger online dating players.
Secondly, their most recent quarter really shows the true turnaround in the company. JDate.com is where the majority of their value comes from and recently they have been “running off” their general dating sites, such as americansingles.com because it’s simply too competitive a space. Their real advantage is in the niche dating sites such as Jdate. The run-off is nearly complete, and despite losing over 10,000 subscribers in the general market segment as part of this run-off, they actually had a net gain in subscribers with strong growth from JDate and their other affinity networks in Q1 2010.
The numbers compare Q1 2010 with Q1 2009:
Average Paying Subscribers Jewish Networks 93,23584,644 Other Affinity Networks68,12464,393 General Market Networks 7,81317,810 Offline & Other Businesses 661 1,157 Total 169,833168,004
When valuing Spark Networks, the three key variables are obviously subscriber growth, average revenue/user (ARPU), and operating margins. Since I have already indicated why I think they have reached a bottom, let me give you my reasoning behind my growth assumptions.
I took a CAGR in subscriber numbers for JDate from 2004-2009. I can't post the chart here, but it is 3.54%. While the other affinity segments are also important, JDate provides the most value. In addition, their growth tends to run very close with JDate.
I believe that we will see higher than 3.5% growth going forward for two reasons. First, the past few years have been particularly tough for the financial sector (NYC), which has hurt their prospective Jewish member base harder than most. Secondly, with the run-off of their general market networks, the company can now solely focus on managing their affinity networks, which should lead to improved results.
Industry estimates expect online dating to increase about 15%/annum for the next five years. However, my assumptions are much more conservative than that. In my most conservative scenario, I go ahead and model out 3.5% subscriber growth for the ten year model. Again, I think this is a very conservative assumption, but my research has led me to believe that niche dating sites will experience steadier and slower growth than the big players (Match.com and eHarmony).
A good sanity check for these subscriber assumptions can be seen by looking at what percentage of Jewish singles you expect to be JDate subscribers. There are 1.8 million Jewish singles in the U.S. Currently there are over 86,000 subscribers, which represents 4.7% of the entire U.S. Jewish singles market. If we assume that 55% (their current mix) of subscribers in year 10 will be attributed to Jdate, then they will have captured 7% of the market, which seems very reasonable given their current dominance.
Number of Jewish Singles in U.S.
1,800,000 End of Year 10 Users231,465 % attributed to Jdate55% Jdate users 127,305.72 Market Penetration7.07%
Then the question of ARPU comes into play. This is the most difficult to model because it is tough to say how management will play this card because they could certainly slash ARPU to try and accelerate growth. However, given my ultra-conservative subscriber growth estimates, I feel comfortable leaving ARPU steady at 2009 figures ($290/year). Note that this averages to $24/month, which is still considerably less than Match.com ($30/month), and eHarmony ($60/month). You could potentially take issue with my ARPU stance because their latest quarter ARPU dropped to around $247/year on average, but I think is more of a temporary mix in subscriber preferences. If you do believe ARPU will go down, I think you have to believe in higher subscriber growth, which in the models I have created tend to cancel each other. Therefore, in my model below, I keep ARPU steady at 2009 numbers of $290/year.
This just leaves one more key assumption: operating margins. Spark’s operating margins have fluctuated from 17% to 20% over the past few years. With their run-off of their general market segment, they should experience considerable margin improvement since the general market segment experienced much worse ROI due to increased competition. I model operating margins gradually improving from 17% to 20% by the end of the ten year DCF. This would put them right around the industry average. Again, I feel like this is very conservative because 1) JDate is such a dominant brand and 2) they are still building out some of their other affinity networks, and as they start to let some of the less successful ones run-off, it will help tick margins higher.
Then, with an 11% Discount Rate, net capex of zero, their negative working capital benefit, a 3% terminal rate, and their net cash, my most conservative DCF model still values them at $4.21, which is 21% above the current market price.
So there you have it. An excellent business that has downside protection ($3.10/share offer from GHP), a strong likelihood for a higher offer, and is 21% undervalued even using my most conservative estimates. I actually believe shares are worth closer to $6, and that the current price represents little downside risk, but huge upside. Check out The College Edge on www.CollegeStockPicks.com for more of my recommendations.
Variant View
The mispricing exists because:
-Spark's small market cap and low share price keep many insitutions away -Without a detailed look at the company, investors have seen declining subscribers, even though this should make the business more profitable -Investors have had a tough time isolating Jdate's value, but with the run-off of their general dating sites nearly complete, this should no longer be a problem.
Disclosure: Connor Haley was Long LOV at the time of writing
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Own your own sports team and make money doing it
June 22nd, 2010
In this write-up, I will first give all the reasons why I like MSG and think that it is conservatively worth $32/share with upside over $50. Then, I will thoroughly address the variant view.
There are many reasons to like MSG:
Reasons to like MSG
Thesis
Shares of Madison Square Garden (MSG), which were recently spun off of Cablevision, offer investors the opportunity to buy a collection assets (Knicks, Rangers, the Garden, MSG/MSG+) at a serious discount to their private market value.
My sum of the parts analysis suggests that at the current price, there is little downside, but significant upside. Specifically, I believe that MSG’s assets are worth at least $32 with upside over $50. Below is a brief description of each of the segments followed by my conservative sum of the parts valuation. Even using the most conservative estimates, I reach a value of $32 a share.
Media
MSG owns and operates three cable networks, MSG, MSG+, and the Fuse network. These networks generate revenue through subscriber fees from pay-tv operators (approx. 80% of segment revenue) as well as through advertising (approx. 20% of segment revenue).
MSG/MSG+: The most valuable of the Company’s networks, MSG and MSG+ are regional sports networks that broadcast the New York Knicks, New York Rangers, New York Liberty, New York Islanders, New Jersey Devils, Buffalo Sabres and New York Red Bulls games. Additionally, they carry several other sports programming, including major college basketball and football games. The first major non-Knicks/Rangers contract, with the Buffalo Sabres, ends in 2017. Each network has over 8 million subscribers, primarily in the NY, NJ, and CT areas.
FUSE: Fuse focuses on music related programming including coverage of premier artists, events and festivals, original content and high profile concerts and has over 50mm subs.
*The media segment is the easiest to predict as much of it is based on contracts with the cable operators that are somewhat predictable. I expect 2010 EBITDA of $153-159 million. I take the midpoint of that range for my valuation.
Sports
MSG owns and operates the:
*The sports segment assumes the teams perform slightly better and the Knicks pay lower luxury tax, but still produces negative EBITDA. It should be noted that the Knicks paid out $24.9 million in 2008 and $23.5 million for the nine months ended September 30, 2009 for costs associated with transactions relating to players on our sports teams for season-ending and career-ending injuries, but mainly for waivers and terminations of players and other team personnel, including team executives. However, these costs should come down as the team basically has a clean slate heading into this summer’s free agent frenzy. It should be noted that under my conservative assumptions, I am not valuing any sort of catalyst for the Knicks/ media segment that one or two big-time free agents could provide. I take the midpoint of my 2010 Consolidated Sports EBITDA estimated range to get to a small loss (approx. 10 million) for my valuation.
Entertainment
MSG creates, produces, and presents a variety of live productions. It earns revenue based on ticket sales on shows that it promotes, as well as license fees on non-promoted shows.
The Company has 100% ownership of Madison Square Garden Arena, the Theater at Madison Square Garden, and the Chicago Theater (purchased in 2008 for $16 million). It also owns 50% of the 4.5 million square feet of air rights above MSG. It has long term leases on the Radio City Music Hall and Beacon Theater, and a long-term booking agreement with the Wang Theater. In total, the Company’s venues host over 800 events per year.
*The entertainment segment is the most economically sensitive, and therefore the most difficult to predict, but these assumptions are fairly conservative with 2010 expectations still far below 2007 profitability. I have decided to assign ZERO value for this segment in my sum of the parts valuation. The reason for this is that it is difficult to predict, and I feel that assigning it zero value is an extremely conservative assumption that potentially provides my valuation considerable upside with an improving economy. This makes me feel more comfortable with the valuation since I am not really betting on an economic recovery (although that would also obviously provide considerable upside).
Valuation:
One of the primary reasons investors are dismissing MSG is that the approximately $800 million of cap ex remaining related to a major renovation at Madison Square Garden will not be a good investment for shareholders. I generally agree with that statement because it is difficult to know exactly how the capex will be spent, although there are several ways it could increase sales and attract more marquee events. Regardless, I have treated this expense in my conservative valuation as if the company just burns all $800 million in cash and receives zero economic benefit.
2009 Forbes Values:
Knicks (2nd most valuable NBA franchise): $586 million http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/32/basketball-values-09_New-York-Knicks_328815.html
New York Rangers: $416 million: http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/31/hockey-values-09_New-York-Rangers_315381.html
*The Sports Forbes values only account for The New York Knicks and New York Rangers. Therefore, my valuations disregard any value from the New Yor,k Liberty or Hartford Wolf Pack
Why My Assumptions Are Conservative
All recent sports transactions have been at significant premiums to the Forbes Values and none of them have had the allure of
MSG and MSG+ are largely “Tivo-proof” since most viewers prefer to watch sports live, and operate under long-term contracts. Because of this, they command premium pricing and deserve a higher multiple. Several research reports agree with this thinking and point to a variety of recent transactions as evidence.
For example, in November of 2009, Liberty Media merged its stake in DirecTV along with its RSNs, and as part of a fairness opinion associated with the transaction, the middle end of the valuation for the RSNs valued them at approximately 11x EBITDA (the multiple I used for 2010E). There is no reason why MSG and MSG+ aren’t worth similar multiples. “RSN’s” typically traded around 15-20 EBTIDA multiples before the financial crisis, and recent transactions have been in the 10-15 multiple range. Because of this, I feel like the 11 EBITDA multiple is very reasonable for such a high end RSN that consistently produces over 100M in EBITDA and could potentially benefit from this summer’s big NBA free agency splash.
The entertainment business is perhaps the trickiest to value because it has been pretty volatile, and is more sensitive to the health of the economy. In 2006 and 2007, this segment produced over $40 million of EBITDA and EBITDA margins of 16.6% and 14.9%, respectively. In 2008, MSG expanded at the worst possible time, and the other businesses in this segment also came under pressure. As a result, EBITDA declined to marginally positive levels, but MSG has made significant adjustments across this segment after the financial crisis. Despite the potential value here, I have decided to assign zero value to this segment since it is very sensitive to the economy and basically broke even last year. I feel that this is yet another VERY conservative assumption.
The sale and recent valuation of Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment, the Company which owns the Air Canada Centre, the Raptors (NBA), Maple Leafs (NHL), and the regional sports networks which broadcast the team’s games is a good comp because it included an arena, an NBA team, an NHL team, and the regional sports networks, but this still represented a minority interest in far less valuable assets near the height of the economic crisis, all of which point to significantly more value for MSG’s similar assets, with potential additional value from MSG’s entertainment assets, Fuse network, MSG air rights, etc. In December of 2008, a 7.5% minority interest was sold in Maple Leaf Sports for $90 million, valuing the whole Company at $1.2 billion. This suggests much greater value for MSG’s assets. Remember that MSG’s market cap is currently only 1.6B.
The Variant View:
1) Questionable Management
2) MSG is spending too much (approx. 800 million) to renovate The Garden, which is unlikely to be a good investment for shareholders
3) Potential NBA lockout (this actually applies to the NHL as well)
Concluding points: The three points addressed in the variant view are legitimate, but I don’t think it justifies the dirt cheap valuation. If you’re uncomfortable with the management situation, or looking for a company selling at a huge discount to present free cash flow, this is probably not for you. However, Madison Square Garden is a classic deep value special situation, with informational inefficiencies surrounding a spin off, sports franchises that are poised for a rebound (summer free agency), and a collection of irreplaceable trophy assets selling at a serious discount to private market value. As the company gets more institutional coverage, I expect this spinoff to outperform the market as it trades back up to realistic multiples. In addition, I would not be surprised if the company was taken private at a substantial premium, which is exactly what has happened to every other recent U.S. based public sports team.
Regards,
Connor Haley
Disclosure: At the time of writing, Connor Haley owned shares of Madison Square Garden (MSG).
Disclosure: Long MSG
Activision Blizzard (ATVI): Game On!
In an industry that has come under fire lately, one company has continued to shine.
Activision Blizzard (ATVI), now the world’s largest maker of video game, remains as committed to innovation and excellence as ever, and continues to stay strong in these tough times.
1) THE BUSINESS
Activision Blizzard is an undisputed leader of the video game industry. As their industry undergoes a significant transformation, they have managed to avoid the pitfalls that some of its major rivals have fallen into. For instance, Electronic Arts, hasn’t posted positive earnings in years and has lost 75% of its value since its 2008 highs. Activision Blizzard, has not only stood pat during this time, but has also managed to position itself as its industry’s leader for years to come. The “Activision” segment is the more traditional (yet still excellent) developer and publisher of console and computer games such as the enormously popular Tony Hawk, Call of Duty, and Guitar Hero franchises. This segment of the businessis known for its volatility, which should be expected from the traditional video game industry: when a popular, well marketed new video game is released, money can come flooding into the company, but it can then experience periods of relatively little cash coming in. However, in what I see as an ingenious merger, Activision joined forces with Blizzard Entertainment.
Unlike it’s console-based peers, Blizzard specializes in the new online gamingspace that is revolutionizing the industry. These are games like the massively successful World of Warcraft franchise. Developers are able to continually improve and expand the product even after the game is released through online updates and expansion packs. But that’s not even the best part (at least not for investors). With these kinds of games, the developer can collect regular subscription fees along with the one-time price of the video game, giving Activision Blizzard to have the best of both worlds: the big hits such as Modern Warfare 2 that rake in millions in just a few weeks, along with the ultra-consistent cash flows from its online subscriber base. In fact, just from WOW alone, Activision Blizzard brings in a cool $75 million every month! No accounting tricks. Just cold, hard cash. And with the long awaited releases of Cataclysm, am expansion pack to World of Warcraft, and Starcraft II, you can be confident that the money will continue flowing in. Throw in a nice 2.5% dividend (unheard of in the gaming industry), and you’ve got one heck of a business.
2) THE MANAGEMENT
The president and CEO of Activision Blizzard, Robert Kotick (“Bobby”) has been in his position for almost twenty years now, and shows no signs of leaving anytime soon. His strategic acquisition of Blizzard Entertainment demonstrates his vision of the gaming industry and his drive to occupy its peak. His CFO/COO, Thomas Tippl, recently described his boss in an interview: “Bobby has incredibly vision, unbelievable energy. Activision Blizzard is his job, his hobby, and his sport.” Now THAT is what I like to hear about a Chief Executive.
3) THE PRICE
Don’t be fooled by the high P/E multiple of 48. Instead, you should looking at the company’s Price/ Free Cash Flow, a more accurate measurement of a company’s value. The cash machine that is Activision Blizzard is currently only trading at about 11x free cash flow, a very good value for a company expected to grow at a rate of 14% over the next five years. Plus, an industry leader and cash flow machine like Activision Blizzard deserves to be trading at a PEG higher than 1.08!
4) THE SAFETY NET
Using very reasonable growth assumptions, I peg the fair value of Activision Blizzard somewhere around near $17 range (and that’s not even including the $2.63 cash per share they’ve got in the bank), but the stock is still hovering around $11, giving you a 35% margin of safety on your investment. Also don’t forget they pay a nice dividend as well so you get paid to wait for the market to wake up to the true value of this great business.
5) THE EXECUTION
We’re in Activision Blizzard for the long haul, so we don’t need to sweat too much about a few pennies on our entrance. Given the value of this company and the discount at which the market is offering it, I am a buyer of this stock right now.
By Connor Haley with Sam Souryal
Disclosure: At the time of writing, Connor Haley owned shares of Activision Blizzard (ATVI). Sam does not own any shares in the companies mentioned.
Disclosure: LONG ATVI
Add Some Love to Your Portfolio
With downside protection from a recent buyout offer, an inflection point in number of subscribers, a strong likelihood for a higher buyout bid, and a ridiculously cheap valuation, Spark Networks (LOV) is my favorite current holding and is an active recommendation in The College Edge on www.CollegeStockPicks.com
Shares currently trade at $3.47, but I value them closer to $6. Even my most conservative estimate (which I share below) values them $4.21, or 20% undervalued.
For those unfamiliar with this small-cap (70 MM), they operate several different niche online dating sites, most notably JDate.com.
Online dating (especially niche dating sites) is a great business:
• Customers supply the inventory (pictures of themselves)
• The company has negative working capital benefit (subscribers pay monthly subscription upfront)
• Online subscription dating industry averages 20% operating margins (Match(part of IACI), Meetic, eHarmony)
• Subscription based dating is an attractive oligopoly: Top 5 control 80% of the market, generate $1.2bn in revenue with industry profits of $240mn+ annually.
• Attractive value proposition--- avg sub pays $27.50 for JDate and $15 for other affinity
• 100mm singles in US (short cycle, high churn, very profitable business)
What makes JDate particularly attractive (taken from investor presentation)
• 80% come to the site organically (word of mouth referrals and high winback rates)
• Spends only 33% of the industry avg in marketing (6-7% vs. 20%+)
• 13 years in business.... it dominates the Jewish dating market in major metropolitan cities in US.
• 1/3 of members make over $100K, 2/3 make over $55K
• 45% of graduate degrees
• 94% of subscribers have college degrees
• 55% women 45% men
• 90-93% contribution margins = revenue less marketing
Two recent events highlight JDate’s value. First, Great Hill Partners (GHP), a private equity firm which owns 44% of the shares outstanding, recently offered to take the company private at $3.10/share, which represented a small premium to the existing price. Several big stakeholders, notably Osmium Partners, came out and urged the special committee to vote against the takeover, as they valued the company at $6-7 per share. The bid was rejected unanimously from the special committee, and they hired Piper Jaffray to “pursue other strategic alternatives.” In essence, I think that there is a good chance that we will see a higher offer--- either from Great Hill Partners or even one of the bigger online dating services such as Match.com, which would then dominate the niche dating area. Online dating is highly scalable, and at its current valuation, Spark Networks would be a steal for one of the bigger online dating players.
Secondly, their most recent quarter really shows the true turnaround in the company. JDate.com is where the majority of their value comes from and recently they have been “running off” their general dating sites, such as americansingles.com because it’s simply too competitive a space. Their real advantage is in the niche dating sites such as Jdate. The run-off is nearly complete, and despite losing over 10,000 subscribers in the general market segment as part of this run-off, they actually had a net gain in subscribers with strong growth from JDate and their other affinity networks in Q1 2010.
The numbers compare Q1 2010 with Q1 2009:
Average Paying Subscribers
Jewish Networks 93,235 84,644
Other Affinity Networks 68,124 64,393
General Market Networks 7,813 17,810
Offline & Other Businesses 661 1,157
Total 169,833 168,004
When valuing Spark Networks, the three key variables are obviously subscriber growth, average revenue/user (ARPU), and operating margins. Since I have already indicated why I think they have reached a bottom, let me give you my reasoning behind my growth assumptions.
I took a CAGR in subscriber numbers for JDate from 2004-2009. I can't post the chart here, but it is 3.54%. While the other affinity segments are also important, JDate provides the most value. In addition, their growth tends to run very close with JDate.
I believe that we will see higher than 3.5% growth going forward for two reasons. First, the past few years have been particularly tough for the financial sector (NYC), which has hurt their prospective Jewish member base harder than most. Secondly, with the run-off of their general market networks, the company can now solely focus on managing their affinity networks, which should lead to improved results.
Industry estimates expect online dating to increase about 15%/annum for the next five years. However, my assumptions are much more conservative than that. In my most conservative scenario, I go ahead and model out 3.5% subscriber growth for the ten year model. Again, I think this is a very conservative assumption, but my research has led me to believe that niche dating sites will experience steadier and slower growth than the big players (Match.com and eHarmony).
A good sanity check for these subscriber assumptions can be seen by looking at what percentage of Jewish singles you expect to be JDate subscribers. There are 1.8 million Jewish singles in the U.S. Currently there are over 86,000 subscribers, which represents 4.7% of the entire U.S. Jewish singles market. If we assume that 55% (their current mix) of subscribers in year 10 will be attributed to Jdate, then they will have captured 7% of the market, which seems very reasonable given their current dominance.
Number of Jewish Singles in U.S.
1,800,000
End of Year 10 Users 231,465
% attributed to Jdate 55%
Jdate users 127,305.72
Market Penetration 7.07%
Then the question of ARPU comes into play. This is the most difficult to model because it is tough to say how management will play this card because they could certainly slash ARPU to try and accelerate growth. However, given my ultra-conservative subscriber growth estimates, I feel comfortable leaving ARPU steady at 2009 figures ($290/year). Note that this averages to $24/month, which is still considerably less than Match.com ($30/month), and eHarmony ($60/month). You could potentially take issue with my ARPU stance because their latest quarter ARPU dropped to around $247/year on average, but I think is more of a temporary mix in subscriber preferences. If you do believe ARPU will go down, I think you have to believe in higher subscriber growth, which in the models I have created tend to cancel each other. Therefore, in my model below, I keep ARPU steady at 2009 numbers of $290/year.
This just leaves one more key assumption: operating margins.Spark’s operating margins have fluctuated from 17% to 20% over the past few years. With their run-off of their general market segment, they should experience considerable margin improvement since the general market segment experienced much worse ROI due to increased competition. I model operating margins gradually improving from 17% to 20% by the end of the ten year DCF. This would put them right around the industry average. Again, I feel like this is very conservative because 1) JDate is such a dominant brand and 2) they are still building out some of their other affinity networks, and as they start to let some of the less successful ones run-off, it will help tick margins higher.
Then, with an 11% Discount Rate, net capex of zero, their negative working capital benefit, a 3% terminal rate, and their net cash, my most conservative DCF model still values them at $4.21, which is 21% above the current market price.
So there you have it. An excellent business that has downside protection ($3.10/share offer from GHP), a strong likelihood for a higher offer, and is 21% undervalued even using my most conservative estimates. I actually believe shares are worth closer to $6, and that the current price represents little downside risk, but huge upside. Check out The College Edge on www.CollegeStockPicks.com for more of my recommendations.
Variant View
The mispricing exists because:
-Spark's small market cap and low share price keep many insitutions away-Without a detailed look at the company, investors have seen declining subscribers, even though this should make the business more profitable
-Investors have had a tough time isolating Jdate's value, but with the run-off of their general dating sites nearly complete, this should no longer be a problem.
Disclosure: Connor Haley was Long LOV at the time of writing